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I.

INTRODUCTION

I am honored to have my book, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple
Solutions Fail, serve as the organizing framework for this symposium. 1 The
enterprise has proven valuable as it provided a reason to assemble a set of
articles that focus on important changes in Asian courts in recent decades.
Further, it appears that the reforms in three of the countries are loosely related
to each other. While Japan had a head start on judicial reforms, both Korea
and Taiwan embarked on the same path as soon as they had shed authoritarian
rule. China has pursued a more ambitious project. Court reform is part of a
massive effort to keep up with massive changes in society and the economy
since the 1980s.
I want to underscore that my book is a study of the failure of reforms
in American criminal courts. It is a study of failures even under best case
conditions: where there were smart people, substantial resources, and broadbased support. The book was a sustained reflection on why good ideas were
all but doomed to fail once they were put into effect. I did not find a single
fatal flaw that led to failure and which, if overcome, would lead to success.
But I almost invariably found failure, or at least a lack of any meaningful
increment of change, in the expected direction.
My analytical framework drew from standard sources in organization
theory and implementation studies. It was divided into two parts: the first
examined the stages of change and problems that arise in each of them.2 The
second reflected on the nature of the criminal process and the adversarial
†

Ph.D. U of Minnesota. Claire Sanders Clements Professor, School of Law, University of California
at Berkeley. I want to thank Setsuo Miyazawa for inviting me to participate in the conference that led to this
symposium, the participants at that conference, and to other authors who have contributed to this symposium.
I also want to want to thank David Johnson and Rosann Greenspan for helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this article, and Maia Robbins for her fine editorial work.
1
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS FAIL (1983).
2
FEELEY, supra note 1, at 35–39.
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system in the United States, and emphasized its hyper-fragmentation.3 In my
analysis of the stages of change, I emphasized the goal: what reformers
wanted to achieve in the long term. I worked through the different stages
necessary to get from here to there. They include: diagnosis, initiation,
implementation, routinization, and evaluation. At each of these stages,
distractions, obstacles, and misinformation can easily lead reformers astray.
Take some examples of how reforms can go astray at different stages.
The public universally disapproves of disparity in sentences by race or age or
social background, yet it persists.4 A common response to this is to try to
restrict judicial discretion by establishing sentencing guidelines. 5 This may
help a bit, but it also raises other problems. For example, not all relevant
factors can be anticipated in advance, so sentencing under the new system
results in new forms of inequality and does not overcome old forms.
Furthermore, guidelines are likely to enhance the power of prosecutors to
charge. If so, disparities once visible in judges’ sentencing may now be swept
under the rug by prosecutors’ selective presentation of facts and charges in
plea bargaining. Neither determinate sentencing schemes nor sentencing
guidelines focus precisely on the original problem, say racial disparity in
sentencing, so it may continue unabated as officials tinker with guidelines.
Or, to consider another problem: a well-funded pilot program run by a highly
motivated staff may work wonderfully, but once it is up and running with less
funds and a smaller staff, it can turn into a nightmare. New programs need to
be carefully nurtured into maturity so that once made permanent, they have
the resources and support they need to continue to work well.
Though important, these observations are not deep insights. Anyone
who has undertaken a home renovation project or overseen even a modest
curriculum reform in his or her academic unit is familiar with these sorts of
issues. Things can go awry at any moment and for almost any reason. Key
staff can depart; funding can be cut; programming can be co-opted;
unanticipated obstacles can be encountered. These are challenges that
everyone who seeks to change things in public service encounters. However,
3

Id. at 9–18.
See generally William Rhodes et al., Federal Sentencing Disparity: 2005–2012 (Bureau of Justice
Stats., Working Paper 2015:01, 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fsd0512.pdf; Sonja B. Starr &
M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Charging and Its Sentencing Consequences (Univ.
of Mich. Law School Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 12-002),
http://economics.ubc.ca/files/2013/05/pdf_paper_marit-rehavi-racial-disparity-federal-criminal.pdf.
5
How
Sentencing
Generally
Works,
attorneys.com
(November
10,
2017),
http://www.attorneys.com/criminal-defense/what-are-mandatory-minimum-sentencing-laws.
4
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they are compounded when applied to reforms of the American criminal
process because the American criminal justice system is deeply fragmented
by design and practice. The theory of the adversary process is like the theory
of the market; it is supposed to work best when each part pursues its own
objectives without central control. Furthermore, police are financed and
supervised at the local level; corrections at the state level; courts at the county
level. There is no ministry of justice to oversee it; not at the local level, not
at the state level, and not at the national level. There are neither coherent
political controls nor coherent bureaucratic controls. In most places, there are
not even meaningful criminal justice coordinating councils. On top of this,
courts deal with near-pathological problems that cannot be solved by more
powerful social control institutions, such as the family, church, and school.
It is this combination of factors––the various stages of securing change
on the one hand and the seemingly intractable problems and fragmented
features of the American criminal process on the other—that led me to try to
reorient thinking about court reform. Indeed, it led me to turn things upside
down. Instead of offering advice on how would-be reformers can keep their
eye on the ball and achieve success, I started with the assumption that failure
is normal and natural, and that success is rare and unexpected. Feeley’s law
of court reform: Unless a host of heroic conditions are present to overcome
the myriad of built-in constraints, failure will almost certainly ensue. Indeed,
in the United States since the book was first published, still more reforms have
been adopted and hundreds of billions of dollars spent to improve the criminal
justice system; yet it is not clear that there have been any substantial
improvements. And, even if so, it is not clear that these improvements are the
result of planning. Most of the massive increases in funds were not used to
develop more efficient and effective programs, but instead simply to arrest
more people, impose harsher conditions on probation, increase the length of
sentences, and restrict or eliminate parole.6
Planned change with innovative and carefully evaluated reforms is rare.
Furthermore, the handful of careful evaluations that have been completed
almost always reveal failure or near-failure. For instance, for nearly three
decades between the late-1950s until the mid-1980s, as Court Reform on Trial
6
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY AND
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, 1968–1978 (U. Minn. Press 1980). See also DAVID
GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Oxford
Uni. Press 2002); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE W AR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED
DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (Oxford Uni. Press 2007).
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shows, reformers in several big cities set out to reduce reliance of money bail
and reduce the numbers of pretrial detainees. Despite commitments, vast
amounts of special funding, and the establishment of a number of promising
programs, no lasting changes were produced. Now, thirty to forty years after
this concentrated effort, an even higher proportion of arrestees are held in jail
before trial than fifty years ago.7 The same sort of desultory result holds for
sentencing reforms and pretrial diversion. Planned, thoughtful efforts at
reform have made little or no difference and many appear to have been
counterproductive. Court Reform on Trial did not fully anticipate the effects
of the war on crime that was just gaining strength as the book was finished;
but it was, I think, spot on as to why even carefully planned court reform
continues to fail in the United States. 8
II.

COURT REFORM ON TRIAL IN ASIA

The articles in this symposium reveal that court reforms in Asia have
followed a somewhat different path. Most efforts have been relatively modest
and with limited objectives. Within these parameters, most have been at least
partially successful, as best we can tell. Certainly they have not been the
spectacular failures that my book recounts for the United States. Nor are the
authors of the studies in this volume as pessimistic as I am.
The differences are not due to the failure of the framework in Court
Reform. The authors of the case studies are faithful to the framework and
employ it. Some of the studies reveal how inchoate ideas took form and
developed, and then were examined––at times, in depth and for several years.
They were then formulated and modified in negotiations before being adopted
and then altered again at the implementation stage, and once again as they
were institutionalized. Some were carefully evaluated; others were not. Most
of them have not been around long enough for anyone to be confident about
their long-term effects. Still, most of them are well past their birth stages.
The headaches I described in conception, birth, and maturation are readily
apparent in the accounts offered by the several authors. Still, most have
survived and, by their own terms, have been modestly successful. The
reforms are so different and the accounts so varied and dense that it is

7

See, e.g., Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stephenson, The Down Stream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711.
8
See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 6.
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impossible to summarize them here. But after Setsuo Miyazawa’s helpful
introduction to the symposium,9 they should jump out at the reader.
What, then, underlies the disparity between my assessment of
American reforms and those of the authors in this symposium? Two reasons
can account for it: differences in A) structure and B) substance.
A.

Differences in Structure

In Court Reform on Trial, I identified three causes of dismal failure: a
dysfunctional adversary process, a fragmented criminal justice system, and a
fragmented governmental system. In contrast, the authors in this symposium
all focus on civil law systems—systems common to most Asian countries.
These systems may have some adversarial features, but are decidedly more
integrated, centralized, and hierarchical than those in the United States.
Although there are vast differences and ranges of examined reforms among
the four countries under consideration in this symposium, all four countries
share two features that distinguish them from the United States. First, they
are all unitary countries with one national justice system. While some may
be more decentralized than others, each has only one unitary criminal and civil
justice system. They have one judicial system. They have one centralized
prosecutorial system. They have one central law enforcement system. They
have one centralized penal system.
In contrast, consider the United States. The country is a federal system,
yet it administers criminal justice almost entirely at the state and local level.
Accordingly, there are fifty-plus criminal justice systems in the United States.
Within the states, criminal justice administration and policy is decentralized.
Although criminal law is adopted and applied statewide, it is administered
locally. This means that there is not one prosecutor’s office, but one for each
county––58 in California, 254 in Texas, and 3142 nationwide. There are
roughly this many courts, with judges usually selected at the county level.
Furthermore, there are over 18,000 separate law enforcement agencies; almost
every city, town, or county, however small, has its own separate police force.
Although nominally required to enforce and apply state law, local norms
shape how the law is enforced and administered.

9

Setsuo Miyazawa, East Asian Court Reform on Trial: Introduction to the Symposium, 27 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 1 (2017).
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In short, the American criminal justice system is extremely fragmented.
This means that policies adopted at one level must be administered by
agencies at another level. Their competence and priorities may be quite
different. For example, county-based prosecutors and judges are acutely
aware that if they impose a term in the county jail when charging and
sentencing convicted offenders (usually less than a year), the county must pay
the costs of incarceration. But, if the prosecutors send the offender to prison
for one year or more, the state bears the cost of incarceration. This factor is
often of significant consideration in sentencing decisions.
As another example, each of the four countries examined in this
symposium has a powerful national ministry of justice whose major task is to
oversee and coordinate criminal justice and judicial functions. The United
States federal government, states, counties, and cities do not have a ministry
of justice. There is no one in charge of thinking about—or even
coordinating—common concerns in the administration of justice or reflecting
on how changes in one place affect others elsewhere. This tends to result in
reforms which are often promoted by people from outside the system and with
little buy-in from core justice system officials. Alternatively, they are
instituted by one agency in the system, with little support from others. In
either situation, reform is often like a child squeezing a balloon: she may
squeeze it at one place, but it only pops out at another as the air shifts.
Although Asian courts have this advantage, this by itself does not
guarantee success. As Miyazawa and Mari Hirayama’s article suggests,
reforms may have their own pathologies in Asian courts as well. 10 Still,
whether a reform is initiated by a group within a ministry of justice or wholly
outside it, at a minimum a central ministry is able to bring stakeholders, both
inside and outside the government, to the table to seriously consider the
reform. It must be admitted, however, that a powerful ministry has the
capacity to keep reform issues off the agenda and to ensure that they will
garner no serious attention.11 Still, the various case studies of reform in this
symposium all reveal that whether initiated from within or from without a
ministry of justice, ministries eventually became central players in the
planning process.
10
Setsuo Miyazawa & Mari Hirayama, Introduction of Videotaping of Interrogations and the
Lessons of the Imaichi Case: A Case of Conventional Criminal Justice Policy-Making in Japan, 27 WASH.
INT’L L.J. 149 (2017).
11
See, e.g., DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN J APAN
(2007) (offering a sustained comparison of Japanese and American criminal process in action).
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In Japan, for instance, in each of the case studies of reforms, ministry
officials and their allies were able to stall, co-opt those wanting more
expansive reform, and narrow the range of options up for serious
consideration. In short, they dominated or almost dominated the process from
start to finish. For example, as Matthew J. Wilson’s article shows,12 Ministry
officials were able to stall considerations of the reintroduction of the jury
system for over forty years. When they finally yielded, they defined the issue
so narrowly that it all but gutted the bar’s original rationale for it, which was
to curb the prosecutor’s domination of the courtroom and strengthen the
position of the defense attorney. Similarly, Miyazawa and Hirayama show
how a plan to restrain the vast interrogation power attributed to police and
prosecutors has increased the power of police and prosecutors.13
B.

Differences in Substance

The second factor that distinguishes the Asian reforms from those I
examined is substance. My project focused on four reforms with well-defined
substantive aims. Bail reform was designed to reduce the number of arrestees
held in jail prior to adjudication and reduce bail amounts; pretrial diversion
was designed to redirect some jail-bound defendants into community
programs that would allow them to avoid conviction and jail time; speedy trial
reforms were designed to reduce time between arraignment and disposition
and to reduce pretrial detention; and sentence reforms were aimed at reducing
disparity. Judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other officials involved
in the criminal justice system generally supported these changes.
Furthermore, either Congress or state legislatures supported them with ample
funding. In short, they should have been “best case” examples of reforms.
Still, for different reasons, the reforms have not produced their
anticipated results and have been, in some instances, counter-productive.
After years of reform efforts and numerous established special bail reform
programs and pretrial release agencies, there is no evidence that they have
produced these results. Thirty-five years later, the problem is worse. 14
Similarly, there is no evidence that pretrial diversion programs and speedy
trial initiatives have worked. Pretrial diversion was designed to redirect jailbound offenders into community programs where they would avoid both
12

Matthew J. Wilson, Assessing the Direct and Indirect Impact of Citizen Participation in Serious
Criminal Trials in Japan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 75 (2017).
13
See generally Miyazawa & Hirayama, supra note 10.
14
Heaton, Mayson, & Stephenson, supra note 7.

280

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 1

conviction and jail. Over the past thirty years, study after study has shown no
effect. The vast majority of those enrolled in diversion programs would not
have gone to jail absent the programs. Instead, they would have received
straight probation.15 These programs expand, rather than contract, the net of
social control.16 Similarly, speedy trial rules may have reduced caseprocessing times overall, but they do so by converging towards the mean.
Some cases take less time, but others now take more time. Sentencing reforms
have, quite simply, led to disaster.17
In contrast to the American reforms that I examined, all the reforms
addressed at length in this symposium focus on process. The aims of the most
ardent proponents of the reforms were either indirect or obscure. The
Japanese bar mounted a decades-long struggle to revive the jury trial that once
operated in Japan. Its hope was that jurors would be independent enough to
weaken the prosecutor’s hegemony in the criminal process so that jurors could
exercise real power.18 This hope, however, was dashed when Parliament
adopted a mixed jury system, in which lay jurors sit with professional judges.
This arrangement does little if anything to weaken the powers of the
prosecutor. If anything, it provides a symbol of lay participation without
much, if any, substance.19 Perhaps jurors will do more in the future, but I have
seen no evidence that they will.
Indeed, Wilson’s contribution in this volume emphasizes that jury trials
have been extended to only a tiny handful of cases, and that evaluations focus
almost exclusively on how smoothly the new jury system has been
implemented. The Ministry of Justice, he reports, is concerned with the “halo
effect” of the new jury system—public support it has generated and the sense
of efficacy that people feel after they have served on a jury.20 There has been
15

Thomas G. Blomberg, Penal Reform and the Fate of Alternatives, in PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL
CONTROL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHELDON MESSINGER (2003).
16
Stanley Cohen, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL (1985). This book brought this seemingly inevitable
consequence to the fore in studies of criminal justice reform.
17
MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN THE AMERICAN PENAL
SYSTEM (Oxford Uni. Press 2004) (an excellent survey and analysis which reports on the counter-productive
effects of American sentencing polices since the late 1970s are voluminous). See also GARLAND, supra note
6; SIMON, supra note 6.
18
At least this was the hope of the many Japanese lawyers I spoke to at meetings of the Jury Trial
Study Groups in Osaka, Kobe, and Tokyo throughout the late 1980s.
19
Wilson’s study, supra note 12, does an excellent job providing context and history of this reform
and describing its reception. He seems to think the reform is a modest success. In addition, there is rapidly
expanding literature in both English and Japanese that assesses the early experience with the new jury system
in Japan.
20
See Wilson, supra note 12, at 104.
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virtually no attention to whether the jury system has shifted power relations
among prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.
Similarly, Daniel H. Foote’s study traces the history of the bar’s effort
to diversify the judiciary by recruiting mature, experienced, and
independently-minded lawyers: people who could be skeptical of claims made
by police and prosecutors and who would be less subservient to the judicial
bureaucracy and Ministry of Justice.21 However, the effort resulted in a
system that excluded such lawyers. It instead promoted diversity by sending
young assistant judges on postdoctoral-like experiences abroad or to work for
law firms in Tokyo or Osaka—experiences that might be valuable, but not
likely to weaken the hegemony of the judicial bureaucracy and the Ministry
of Justice.22 Foote emphasizes that a number of practical factors stood in the
way of more substantial changes, but he goes on to note that there were no
serious efforts to overcome them because no one in the Ministry really wanted
them. The results were marginal changes that marginally useful. But none of
the grand objectives sought by those who initiated the reform effort were even
pursued, let alone realized.23
Japan’s new policy that allows victims to sit with judges on the bench
during a criminal trial is fascinating to this American observer, since by
American standards it is a major change. In Japan, in some serious cases, the
victim can now participate in the process, and even ask questions of the
accused and offer statements to the court. This appears to be a dramatic and
unique change. The United States accords victims no similar opportunities.
In Japan, as in the United States, many cases are dropped early on in the
process, but those that remain go on to trial. In the United States, only a
handful of even the most serious cases go to trial; almost all cases are resolved
through plea bargains, leaving few trials in which victims could participate.24
Of course, in the United States, victims appear as witnesses in open court
hearings, both at trial and sentencing and in some pretrial hearings. Likewise,
in some states, victims have an opportunity to present a victim’s impact
statement at sentencing, and some do so. Still, they do not sit near the judge
in the trial and intervene at will, as they now can in Japan. An American
might be concerned that a victim’s more active role in the guilt phase of the
Daniel Foote, Diversification of the Japanese Judiciary, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 7 (2017).
Id. at 48.
23
See id. at 66–68.
24
Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 472–73 (2004).
21
22
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trial would unduly influence the jury and judges, but this has not been a
problem in Japan. Conviction rates already approach 100% in Japan, so
victim participation is unlikely to increase the likelihood of conviction, though
of course it might influence the length of the sentence.25 Furthermore, in
eighty percent of cases, victims decline to participate. However, as Erik
Herber concludes, this new policy “in itself can be qualified as a successful
legal reform, or at least the beginning of one.”26
Despite limits on the role of victims in the United States, this qualified
success may have an American counterpart. In the late 1970s, the criminal
courts in Dade County, Florida began notifying victims of the court dates of
their alleged assailants and inviting them to attend.27 This extended to plea
negotiations that took place in open court, and victims were invited to
comment on the proposed deal. Researchers assessing this innovation
reported two important findings: a vast majority of victims appreciated being
invited to these meetings, but very few in fact showed up.28
Miyazawa and Hirayama emphasize that the policies of diversification
of the judiciary described by Foote, the introduction of lay judges discussed
by Wilson, and the introduction of victim participation analyzed by Herber,
were all extraordinary policies because they did not originate within the court
system or the Ministry of Justice. Instead, they were successfully pressed on
the courts by forces outside the bureaucracy and, in two cases, outside the
party system. Despite this, as we have seen, the Ministry and the judicial
bureaucracy were able to water down the proposals, adapt them to their own
concerns, and then support changes that worked to their advantage.
In contrast, the proposal to videotape police interrogations originated
within the Ministry of Justice. The proposal was initiated by a new reform
Minister in response to scandals in several cases that revealed prosecutorial
abuse of interrogations.29 Thus, presumably it had the weight of the
government behind it. Furthermore, the proposal was adopted by the Diet and
is scheduled to go into full operation in 2019. But between adoption and
implementation, as Miyazawa and Hirayama show, the Ministry of Justice
Erik Herber, Victim Participation in Japan, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 119, 137–38 (2017).
Id. at 147.
27
Anne Heinz & Wayne Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluating a Reform in Plea
Bargaining, 13 L. & SOC’Y REVIEW 349 (1979).
28
Id.
29
Miyazawa & Hirayama, supra note 10.
25
26
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quietly supported prosecutors and police who opposed it, and turned the law
on its head.
While initiated and adopted as a device to monitor prosecutors, the
experimental use of videotaping of interrogations shows that it may become a
new tool for prosecutors. The caveats, qualifications, and exceptions built
into the law and regulations ensure that prosecutors can videotape at their
discretion and in ways that enhance their ability to obtain confessions.
Miyazawa and Hirayama make a convincing case that videotapes will rarely,
if ever, be used to challenge prosecutorial misconduct. So, videotaping of
confessions is a reform without content. Indeed, it is worse; the reform is
likely to give the appearance of improvement without any substance. In this
sense, it begins to look like court reforms in the United States, i.e., not just
inconsequential, but counterproductive.
Here, Miyazawa and Hirayama explain, important modifications
quietly took place between initiation and the adoption. After the modest
proposal30 was introduced, it was sent to the Ministry of Justice where it was
sliced and diced and used as part of a bargaining process involving other
criminal justice matters. The eventual law was announced with fanfare as a
bold new policy, but as Miyazawa and Hirayama show, it had no bite.
I think that Miyazawa and Hirayama intend their article to do much
more than provide a pessimistic forecast for the future impact of this
legislation. Rather, they intend their case study to be an object lesson about
how criminal justice reforms in Japan generally fare. If so, their conclusions
hit the mark. The several Japanese case studies on reform––whether
originated by powerful groups outside government or from within—point to
the same general conclusions: it is not that conservatives always win; rather,
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice always win. They can co-opt change
agents, study a proposal at length, identify and manufacture a thousand
objections to a proposal, doggedly persist when others shift interest or are
exhausted, and then promote a pale shadow of what was initially introduced.
Something like this appears to be the case in the several bold new initiatives
that were examined in the case studies on Japan.

30

Miyazawa & Hirayama, supra note 10, at 160–64 (emphasizing that the initiative was never directed
at the police, who undertake interrogations which prosecutors heavily rely upon for their cases. Rather, it was
aimed at only a tiny handful of salient cases in which prosecutors intervene to interrogate suspects).
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The other three articles in this symposium address reforms in Korea,31
Taiwan,32 and China.33 How do they fare in contrast to both the United States
and to Japan?
1.

Korea

Yong Chul Park’s article is one of three articles in this symposium that
focuses on the introduction of lay participation in the criminal process. 34 With
the establishment of a stable democratic government in South Korea in 1987,
the governing parties faced a dilemma: how to transform repressive
governmental institutions into ones compatible with democratic values. The
judiciary was one such institution. The Korean judiciary had been party to
repression in the earlier non-democratic regimes. The new democratic
movement considered any number of creative reforms: replacing sitting
judges, electing the judiciary, other forms of public participation in judicial
selection, creating a constitutional court, including lay people on this court,
and creating a jury system.35 Park’s analysis focuses on this last proposal in
the context of certain criminal cases. A law providing for jury trials was
enacted and immediately instated in 2008.36
Park identifies several reasons for the law’s limited success. In an early
and highly-publicized case, a jury convicted the defendant, only to have the
verdict overturned by the Supreme Court. The reversal led many supporters
of the reform to believe that the power of the new jury system was an empty
promise.37 But Park identifies other more fundamental weaknesses of the
jury. It is supposed to “realize democracy in the criminal justice system,” 38
but it is not provided for in the Constitution. Accordingly, he thinks that this
lack of a constitutional foundation has precipitated endless debate among
legal scholars, which has undercut the jury’s legitimacy.39 This may be true;
I would like to see some evidence to support the claim. More convincing is
his analysis demonstrating that the jury trial—unlike its counterpart in
31

Yong Chul Park, Advance Toward “People’s Court” in South Korea, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 177

(2017).
32

Kai-Ping Su, Criminal Court Reform in Taiwan: A Case of Fragmented Reform in a NotFragmented Court System, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 203 (2017).
33
Margaret Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 241 (2017).
34
See also Foote, supra note 21; Su, supra note 32.
35
Park, supra note 31, at 177–81.
36
Id. at 179.
37
Id. at 186.
38
Id. at 199.
39
Id. at 200–01.
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Japan—is not mandatory and is only an option for the accused depending on
the discretion of the court. Furthermore, a jury verdict is only advisory. The
judge can disregard it, though Park reports that judges support the jury’s
decision ninety percent of the time.40 Finally, jury trials are available in only
a tiny handful of very serious offenses––and even then, in sexual assault cases,
victims can request a judge to reject a defendant’s request for a jury trial. 41
It is not surprising, then, that only a very small portion of all criminal
cases involve jury trials; in fact, only a fraction of that small group of cases
permits jury trials. Before the Jury Trial Act was adopted, it was estimated
that there would at least be 300 jury trials a year in Korea—a tiny number to
begin with given the population of the country. But the actual number has
been far less,42 and even after the law significantly expanded opportunities for
jury trials, the number of jury trials has declined.43 As Park notes, “[a]ny
future attempts to increase the number of criminal jury trials do not look
promising.”44 He acknowledges that most people who have served on juries
view their experience positively,45 but because there are so few jury trials and
they are of such low visibility to the public, he cannot imagine them having
any widespread effect on public opinion.
2.

Taiwan

Kai-Ping Su’s analysis of court reform in Taiwan focuses on two
important reforms that have been introduced since the new era of democracy:
the “reformed adversarial system,” adopted in 2002,46 and the proposal for lay
participation, which has been advocated for by the judiciary since at least
2011.47 Su uses the first of these reforms as background for his analysis of
the second proposed reform to permit laypeople to sit in court with judges.48
Unlike Japan and other mixed systems, the judges’ proposal in Taiwan is to
allow lay participation, but to give laypersons no formal role in decisionmaking.
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What is most intriguing about Su’s paper is the reform he takes for
granted. His study examines the mixed effects of reforms introduced in 2014
against the backdrop of an even more important reform introduced in 2001.
That reform established a complicated new hybrid judicial system. 49 He does
not tell us who proposed it or how it came about, but thinks that it has been
successful. The reader infers this because Su identifies the tensions inherent
in the judicial role that flow from a mixed adversarial and inquisitorial
system.50 He seems to be saying that this relatively new hybrid reform is the
cause of the judicial initiative to introduce lay participation. The judicial
concern, as he sees it, is that public opinion polls consistently reveal that
judges are held in very low and declining esteem.51 Additionally, a series of
high-profile corruption cases involving judges have further eroded public trust
in the judiciary.52 These and various other concerns led Taiwan’s President
Tsai In-Wen to establish a Judicial Reform Conference in 2014.53 It is
comprised of 101 ordinary citizens, lawyers, judges, and government officials
tasked with proposing ways to build a judicial system “belonging to the
people, responding to the expectations of the people, and being trusted by the
people.”54 Among the Conference’s priorities is the judges’ long-standing
proposal to introduce lay participants into the criminal trial process.55 As Su
notes, this proposal continues to be supported because of the judges’ strong
belief that if the public sees them in action, it will view them more favorably. 56
Su argues persuasively that this proposal does not sufficiently tie its
objectives to its likely effects. Indeed, he points out that a number of other
reforms with much the same objectives have been adopted, but to no avail.
Support for judges continues to plummet in public opinion polls. 57
Furthermore, he points to an assertion in Court Reform on Trial which holds
that disillusionment about courts results in part from unreasonably high
expectations on the part of victims and the public alike. 58 But his central
point is that it is naïve to think that permitting lay participation will improve
transparency and increase peoples’ trust in courts; this is especially true
because so few cases would even permit lay participation and permitted lay
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participation would be severely circumscribed anyway. The distance between
the vague objective and the proposed action, Su argues, is therefore so great
that it is unreasonable to expect it to have much impact.
No doubt he is correct in this, but what intrigues me most is his assertion
that the low opinion of judges was at least in part brought about by the reform
that created the “hybrid” adversary-inquisitorial judiciary. His claim seems
to be that this change increased public expectations about courts while
undermining their ability—or at least their perceived ability—to do their jobs
effectively. In Court Reform on Trial, I argue that at times, the better a court
performs, the worse it may look. 59 Is this an example of that paradox?
Perhaps. However, I would like to see the evidence that links the decline in
public support to changes in the court structure. The proximate cause of low
support for judges is likely a history of corruption, continuing scandals, and a
well-publicized uproar over a court’s dealing leniently with a man charged
with sexual assault of a young girl. One also wonders to what extent the low
grades given to judges may stem from a lingering resentment rooted in the
long period of military and one-party rule that only ended in the 1990s. How
many of the current judges, for instance, also held office during this period of
repression in which the courts were implicated?
Most importantly, I would like to know more about the history of the
apparently successful establishment of a hybrid judicial system that combines
both adversarial and inquisitorial features. Su suggests that such a change was
possible because the Taiwanese political system is hierarchical and capable of
taking decisive measures.60 Whatever the case, this seems a dramatic and
potentially far-reaching change worthy of sustained analysis. It seems to me
that this, and not the introduction of lay participation, is the more important
innovation.
Still, Su’s skepticism over the proposal to introduce lay participation is
warranted. He notes that the courts have already introduced several other
similar efforts to no avail, and there is no reason to think that lay participation
will be any more effective. 61 Furthermore, his skepticism is strengthened by
Wilson’s and Park’s analyses of lay juries in Japan and Korea, neither of
which report that the reforms have had any significant effects. Despite this,
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he does not identify any potential downside to the proposal. At best, it may
make little difference and at worst, no difference.
3.

China

The court reforms in China that Margaret Y.K. Woo examines are of a
completely different nature than the others considered in this symposium and
in Court Reform on Trial. In contrast to the incremental changes described in
the other articles in this volume, Woo reports on a series of momentous
changes in both law and the courts in China. She characterizes these changes
as “a reflection of national goals and identity.”62 She emphasizes that China
has been in the midst of near continuous political upheaval since 1949 and,
since the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1979, law and legal order have
been central to plans for economic growth and political stability.63 She
identifies a series of momentous changes that are designed to create, in effect,
a dual legal system. One system is designed to facilitate international trade
and investment, where rules are clear and disputes can be settled smoothly
and efficiently. The second system is designed to manage internal domestic
affairs, where disputes are handled under the watchful eye of the Communist
Party which, if need be, can place its thumb on the scales of justice.64
However, Woo’s focus is on developing the state’s capacity to handle
“ordinary” civil litigation. Here, architects of the Chinese legal system have
faced awesome challenges. Among other things, in 1949 the new communist
government did away with law, lawyers, and law schools, and returned to a
version of traditional Confucian mediation with a communist twist. In the
1970s, with the shift to a modified market economy, modern law was
introduced, and so too was Western-style regulation, courts, litigation, legal
training, and lawyers.65 These changes had to be built from the ground up.
Since the 1980s, the economy has grown by leaps and bounds in ways that
have transformed society from top to bottom, and then transformed it again.
The state and the guiding Communist Party have had to scramble to try to
manage such rapid and extensive change. Woo provides an account of how
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those charged with law, courts, and the design of the legal system—both
administrators and Party officials—have coped with these overwhelming
challenges. Rapid change produced disruption on a massive scale, and
ordinary citizens were swamped in a mire of legal problems, which were
compounded by inefficient and corrupt public institutions. The state
responded by trying to establish rule by law, promulgating written
administrative codes and regulations, creating courts, opening new law
schools, and fostering a legal profession all in order to manage burgeoning
legal needs, demands for meaningful resolution of disputes, and an end to
corruption.66 Legal institutions faced the twin problems of coping with rising
expectations and demands on the one hand and shifting priorities of the
national government and Party on the other.67
Woo identifies two factors that account for the failure of the rule of law
reforms of the 1980s. The change from traditional, informal mediation to
formal adjudication was too abrupt,68 and the new and more complicated
system could not cope with the onslaught of demands brought about by the
dislocations and disputes that flowed from rapid development.69
Her article describes how quickly the strong central government,
supported by a strong central political party, was able to shift back to
informality and a modified form of mediation, which was both much faster
and cheaper.70 Overnight, judges were transformed from adjudicators into
mediators.
However, mediation had its own problems. Although faster and more
efficient than litigation in resolving conflicts,71 it did little to establish
precedents, clarify rules, and develop systematic procedures in ways that
facilitate the development of a modern market economy. In addition, Woo
reports, local mediation was a recipe for favoritism and corruption. 72
However, the return to mediation allowed government officials time to come
up with a new plan for a modern legal process that facilitated the rule of law,
uniformity, and the reduction of localism and corruption. They adopted an
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experimental approach, selecting a few regions in which to try out their new
system and then proceeding by trial and error to expand their policies.73
The reform Woo focuses on is the creation of a new type of appellate
court for civil cases. These courts are not appellate courts in the Western
sense of the term. They are proactive, not reactive. They reach out to trial
courts to identify and then review important decisions. They do not listen to
appeals from lower courts, affirm or correct errors, and then return cases to
the trial courts for rehearing. Rather, they reach out to identify significant
cases and publish summaries of them in order to publicize important
principles that add to and clarify the law. It is common law on a fast track.
These courts serve still other functions. They are regional courts and
thus are not closely connected with any particular region. This serves two
purposes: they are more likely to be drawn into provincial-wide corruption
schemes and they are more likely to promote nationwide legal norms.
Furthermore, judges on these tribunals are selected not only for their legal
abilities, but also for their fidelity to the central government. That is, they are
not likely to be corrupt, and they are adept at shifting to follow Party
policies.74
Woo reports that this approach appears to be working well. The new
circuit courts are able to develop legal principles and policies much more
rapidly than conventional appellate courts. Furthermore, because the circuit
courts take their cues from national party leaders, they can shape the law in
ways consistent with national policy. Circuit courts can clarify legal policy
and combat local corruption. They are also effective at transmitting national
directives on how to deal with troublesome issues and institutions—for
instance, with regard to religious groups and non-governmental organizations
pressing for increased freedom of expression and criminal defense attorneys
seeking to zealously represent their clients.75 Indeed, the new circuit courts
have played an active role in the increasingly repressive regime under the
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.
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CONCLUSION

The authors of the case studies in this symposium found it useful to
work through the five stages of reform set out in Court Reform on Trial. They
found what I found: good ideas can flounder as they move from planning to
implementation, and then to institutionalization. Their accounts allow the
reader to trace changes in the process—transformations of goals, shifts in
stockholders, and measures of success. Dreamers gave way to practical
bureaucrats; expansive objectives were scaled downward and, at times,
transformed into symbolic responses. However, in most instances where giant
steps were first announced, baby steps were eventually taken. Still, in almost
all instances, the final products are recognizable from the initial designs, just
substantially scaled down and retooled, even if overblown in claim.
Only in one country—China—were reforms dramatic and far-reaching;
and these reforms were perhaps even more dramatic and far-reaching than
their initial architects anticipated. There, court officials, swamped with cases
in an unworkable legal system and urged on by the Central Committee of the
Community Party, undertook a series of far-reaching changes and
implemented them. When this bold initiative to replace mediation with formal
adjudication became bogged down and overwhelmed, these same officials
were charged with stepping back and rethinking the problems anew. They
came up with another even more dramatic solution which they also imposed
quickly and decisively: back to mediation. And then from this they moved
on, again with bold plans.
The new process was also substantially different. They experimented
with alternative ways to combine local decision-making with central
oversight. To do so, they devised a nuanced and complicated process that
balanced competing interests in a stunning manner: handle cases
expeditiously at the local level and promote consistency through centralized
controls; provide better and faster justice; and create stronger centralized
control that reduces corruption. Part of me was inclined to stand up and cheer
for this bold and brilliant act of judicial administration. But then I realized
that this scheme is designed in part to impose harsher methods of social
control across China. In light of this, decisiveness, effectiveness, and
efficiency, especially in top-down, disciplined one-party countries, look
somewhat less impressive.
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Turning to the reforms in other countries, I have taken the liberty of
suggesting that some of them were modest in scope and made for largely
symbolic reasons. Therefore, they came with few consequences. In my
opinion, new provisions for lay participation fit this description. So too do
the projects to videotape interrogations and allow victims to participate in
trials (though we have to await careful empirical investigation before any
conclusion can be drawn). Still, before I dismiss them as merely symbolic, it
is important to remember that symbols are meaningful, and even symbolic
reforms can be important. The advocates of these reforms may be right;
eventually some of them may promote more respect for, and understanding
about, the criminal courts and public officials. But even if they do not
contribute in any measurable way to public support for the criminal justice
system, there is no evidence that they have made things worse. As we shall
see shortly, this in itself is no small achievement. The authors of the case
studies in this symposium focus on one or two reforms, but some of them also
identify others of significant import. For instance, in Japan, the package that
allowed for the creation of the jury system also provided for plea bargaining.
In Korea, Park focuses on the stalled efforts to establish citizen participation.
They did not have much effect, but he does acknowledge the success of the
more far-reaching changes that established the reformed adversary system, as
well as other reforms. And, of course, Woo identifies a series of massive
changes that were part of a successful campaign based on trial and error.
Considering these reforms as a group, their impacts ranged from modest
to symbolic successes. Furthermore, most of them are aimed at altering
processes: shifting from a judge-only to a collaborative judge and jury
decision, allowing more citizen participation, marginally altering the
recruitment process of judges, and the like. In contrast, the innovations I
assessed in Court Reform on Trial aimed to produce substantive changes:
decrease pretrial detention, redirect jail-bound offenders to pretrial diversion
and treatment programs, reduce case processing time, and reduce disparities
in sentencing. The problems I uncovered with these reforms is that in each
case the results ran contrary to expectations: pretrial detention reforms did not
decrease but increased pretrial detention; pretrial diversion caught up
probation-bound and not jail-bound arrestees; speedy trial rules did not reduce
delays, but shifted them; and sentence reform increased disparities and
sentence lengths. Despite good intentions, well-funded experimental
programs, and well-intentioned advocates, they failed to make significant
dents in the problems they addressed and usually made things worse. Such
was not the case with the reforms in Asia reported in this symposium. The
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reforms make a marginal difference at best and no substantial difference at
worst. The only obviously counter-productive innovation reported in these
case studies was the introduction of videotaping of interrogations by
prosecutors, which Miyazawa and Hirayama believe strengthens, rather than
limits (as was its intention), the power of prosecutors. And, of course, Woo’s
description of the powerful and successful new circuit courts has ominous
implications in a country in which the courts are under the sway of a single
powerful political party.
Of course, the sample size is too limited and the relevant explanatory
factors too numerous to be able to make any firm conclusions about the
conditions for success and failure. But I want to conclude with a brief
discussion of two possibilities that should be regarded as hypotheses and not
explanations.
First, the United States court reforms failed in part because they took
on difficult substantive aims and were met with both opposition and
indifference. Even when they had considerable political and administrative
support, they became bogged down in the hyper-fragmented system. In
contrast, Asian reforms took place in a quite different environment: the courts
are hierarchical and closely associated with national ministries that can
support (and often are the internal sources for) reforms. When the
bureaucracy is mobilized, it can fashion proposals that are likely to be adopted
and institutionalized. Of course, in the process, bold ideas can be replaced
and transformed in all sorts of ways. But reform can be embraced and
effected.
Second, the American criminal process is well established and stable.
It may be highly dysfunctional as my discussion above suggests, but its
components are entrenched and powerful. Furthermore, this entrenched and
powerful system is part of a larger legal system that is highly fragmented and
is itself almost impervious to efforts at systemic change. In contrast to the
American legal system, those of Asia are brand new. At the earliest, they
were created after World War II and for years operated in a one-party state.
China and Japan are still one-party states, although the differences between
them are night and day. But in China, the current legal system stems from the
momentous changes beginning around 1980. Similarly, in both Korea and
Taiwan, the current legal system was created after shedding autocratic oneparty control in the very recent past––1987 in Korea and 2000 in Taiwan.
Their legal systems within functioning democracies are in their infancy and

294

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 1

are not fully formed. Every facet of their operation is characterized by change
and experimentation, including the desire to distinguish themselves from the
process during earlier autocratic periods. Indeed, this same observation holds
for their governmental systems as a whole: their institutions are new and still
in the process of being formed. Setting aside the special case of China, one
might expect Japan to be a model for future development. It has the oldest
and most stable legal system, and its courts and Ministry of Justice appear to
be the most rigid and the least receptive to change and experimentation. If
governments remain stable in Korea and Taiwan, we might then expect their
criminal justice agencies and ministries of justice to follow suit. If so, we can
expect fewer reform initiatives and, when they do occur, to see them co-opted
and domesticated by judicial bureaucracies and ministries of justice.

